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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Brian L. Buniva*
James R. Kibler, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since publication of the 1994 Annual Survey of Virginia
Law' several significant judicial decisions, state statutes and
state regulatory initiatives have demonstrated the increasing
nexus between federal and Virginia environmental law. The
federal and state courts have helped define the interrelation-
ships between environmental law, tort law, land use law, and
procedural/jurisdictional issues related to environmental law.
In the absence of regulatory reform on the federal level, the
General Assembly has enacted several significant statutes. Two
new statutes seek to encourage voluntary cleanup of contami-
nated properties while removing the fear of civil prosecution in
most instances. A further effort to encourage proactive environ-
mental steps by industry can be found in legislation designed to
give tax incentives for installation of certain types of pollution
control equipment. The regulatory front has also seen agency
initiatives which appear to be designed to achieve a balance
between improvement of the environment and reduction of
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unnecessary burdens on Virginia businesses which do not sig-
nificantly inhibit environmental progress.
This article addresses selected developments in the federal
and state legislative and regulatory schemes, and case law from
Virginia state courts, the United States District Courts for the
Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States
Supreme Court. The period covered is from mid-June of 1994
through mid-June of 1995.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AFFECTING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Constitutional Law Decisions
The federal courts decided cases involving takings, the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause and vested rights as those doctrines
relate to environmental law during the last twelve months. The
United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of regulatory
takings, applying the doctrine to land use and zoning in Dolan
v. City of Tigard,2 a five-four decision authored by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist. The Court adopted the new "rough proportional-
ity" test for determining whether a city's exaction of land dedi-
cation as a condition to issuing a development permit constitut-
ed an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. Under this test, a local govern-
ment is required to make an individual determination that a
condition imposed upon the development is roughly proportional
to the impact caused by the development
In Dolan, the City of Tigard, Oregon, had conditioned the
approval of Dolan's building permit on Dolan's dedication of a
portion of her property for flood control and traffic improve-
ments.4 The Court began its analysis of this situation with the
statement that one of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is "to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
2. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
3. Id. at 2329-30.
4. Id. at 2312.
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whole."5 Citing Nollan v. California Coastal Commission6 and
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,' the Court noted that if the city
had simply required Dolan to dedicate a strip of her land for
public use rather than conditioning the grant of the redevelop-
ment permit upon such a dedication, a taking would have oc-
curred since such public access deprives the landowner of the
right to exclude others, a right which is one of the most essen-
tial sticks in the bundle of property rights.' Moreover, the
Court noted that:
Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional condi-
tions,' the government may not require a person to give up
a constitutional right-here the right to receive just com-
pensation when property is taken for a public use-in ex-
change for a discretionary benefit conferred by the govern-
ment where the property sought has little or no relationship
to the benefit.'
The Court first examined the case to determine whether
there was an essential nexus between the legitimate state in-
terest and the permit condition.0 If the nexus exists, then the
degree of connection between the permit conditions and the
projected impact of the development must be evaluated to see if
there is a rough proportionality between the condition imposed
and the nature and extent of the proposed development."
The Court found that an essential nexus existed between the
City of Tigard's requirement that Ms. Dolan dedicate portions
of her property lying within the flood plain for improvement of
storm drainage and dedication of property adjacent to the flood
plain as a bicycle/pedestrian pathway, and the legitimate gov-
ernment purposes of preventing flooding along the creek and
5. Id. at 2316 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
6. 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
7. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
8. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316. It should be noted that the Court classified the
decision of whether or not to issue the redevelopment permit as "an adjudicative [as
distinguished from a legislative] decision to condition petitioner's application for a
building permit on an individual parcel." Id. Moreover, the conditions imposed upon
Dolan were a requirement that she deed portions of her property to the city, not
merely suffer use limitations on her own property. Id.
9. Id. at 2317 (citations omitted).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2317, 2319-20.
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reducing traffic congestion.' The Court held, however, that
there was no rough proportionality between flood protection and
the requirement for Dolan to deed her property to the city.
13
With respect to the bicycle/pedestrian pathway dedication, the
Court found that the city did not meet its burden of demon-
strating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips
generated by the proposed development was reasonably related
to the required dedication of property. 4 The Court reversed
and remanded the case to allow the city to quantify its findings
in support of the dedication for the bicycle pathway beyond the
conclusory statement that the dedication could offset some of
the traffic demand generated by the proposed project. 5 The
Court emphasized that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is
required" but stated that some quantification of impact related
to the exaction is necessary.
16
In Chambers Medical Technologies of South Carolina v.
Bryant,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit analyzed the constitutionality of a South Carolina stat-
ute regulating infectious medical waste." Chambers challenged
the decision of the district court holding that a "fluctuating
treatment cap" mandated by the statute was constitutional
under the Commerce and the Equal Protection Clauses.' The
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Con-
trol (DHEC) challenged the district court's decision that the
12. Id. at 2317-18.
13. "The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one,
was required in the interest of flood control . . . It is difficult to see why recreation-
al visitors trampling along petitioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently related to
the city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and
the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this
part of its request." Id. at 2320-21 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 2321.
15. Id. at 2322.
16. Id.
17. 52 F.3d 1252 (4th Cir. 1995).
18. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-93-10 to -240 (Law. Co-Op. 1993).
19. Chambers Medical Technologies, 52 F.3d at 1255. The statute imposed a cap
on the amount of infectious waste a permitted incinerator facility could incinerate in
any month to no more than one-twelfth of the annual estimate of infectious waste the
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) expected to be generated
within South Carolina each year. Id. at 1257.
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refrigeration requirement of the statute violates the Commerce
Clause.2"
The Fourth Circuit's Commerce Clause analysis began with a
recitation of the well-established principle that the "dormant"
Commerce Clause "prohibits ... legislation that 'unjustifi-
ably... discriminate[s] against or burden[s] the interstate flow
of articles of commerce." 2' One of two tests applies depending
upon the type of regulation at issue.22 Under one test, if the
"statute discriminates against interstate commerce on its face,
in its practical effect, or in its purpose, 'a virtuallyper se rule
of invalidity' applies."' This type of discrimination occurs
when the statute provides "'for differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter."'" In order for a statute to survive the ap-
plication of the per se rule, "the state must demonstrate that
'the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor
unrelated to economic protectionism" 2m and that "there are no
'nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake.'"26
The second test, known as the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.27
balancing test, applies if a state law regulates even-handedly
with regard to in-state and out-of-state interests and the bur-
dens on interstate commerce are only incidental.28 Under such
circumstances the law will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.'m There is no clear line separating
the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid
from the regulation subject to the less intense balancing scrutiny."0
20. Id. at 1263-65.
21. Id at 1256 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct.
1345, 1349 (1994)).
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992)).
24. Id. (quoting Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,
1349-50 (1994)).
25. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)).
26. Id. (quoting Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992)).
27. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
28. Chambers Medical Technologies, 52 F.3d at 1256-57.
29. Id. at 1257.
30. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit held that the fluctuating treatment cap
does not discriminate against interstate commerce on its face,
nor in its practical effect."' The court reasoned that the meth-
od by which the treatment cap is established uniformly burdens
infectious waste generated both in-state and out-of-state.32
Moreover, nothing prohibits Chambers, or any other permitted
commercial waste incineration facility, from choosing to inciner-
ate infectious waste generated out-of-state to the exclusion of
waste generated in-state. 3
The court remanded for further proceedings in the district
court on the question of whether the purpose of the cap re-
quirement was to discriminate against interstate commerce.3
The DHEC urged the court not to remand the case, arguing
that even if the underlying purpose of the cap is to discrimi-
nate against interstate waste, the discrimination is justified by
a valid interest unrelated to economic protectionism, and that
there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to pre-
serve the noneconomic protectionist interest. 5 The court found
that the interests advanced by DHEC36 were valid and unre-
lated to economic protectionism; however, the court also deter-
mined that there were nondiscriminatory alternatives that
would equally or better further these interests.37 The court
concluded that if it must employ heightened scrutiny because of
the legislation's discriminatory purpose, then the statute would
be held unconstitutional." If, on the other hand, the Pike bal-
ancing test is applied, the statute would pass constitutional
muster under the Commerce Clause.39 The court also conclud-
31. Id. at 1258.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1260.
35. Id. at 1261.
36. The valid noneconomic protectionist factors cited by DHEC were: (i) reduction
of the disruption to traffic flow near facilities, (ii) prevention of leaking trailers, and
(iii) minimizing the deposition of noncombusted material in landfills. Id.
37. For example, the State could improve traffic congestion by requiring facilities
to supply adequate parking for trucks waiting to unload at the facility; it could regu-
late the types of containers used to transport the waste to avoid leaks; and it could
impose more stringent incineration requirements to ensure more complete combustion.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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ed that the cap passed constitutional muster under the Equal
Protection Clause, holding that the cap is rationally related to
the legitimate state interests articulated with regard to the
Commerce Clause analysis." The court viewed the question
"as a close one," perhaps defining the outer limits of Equal
Protection Clause analysis under the rational relationship test
in the Fourth Circuit.4
Additionally, the court affirmed the invalidation of the refrig-
eration requirement for waste that travels more than 24 hours
after it leaves its point of generation. The court agreed with the
district court that this requirement discriminates against inter-
state commerce in its practical effect, since only interstate ship-
ments of waste would likely be burdened by the requirement.42
Consequently, the court applied heightened scrutiny, and the
regulation could not withstand the glare.'
B. Personal Injury and Property Damage Cases
Adams v. Star Enterprise" involved an action brought by
landowners against operators of an oil distribution facility in
Fairfax County. The landowners sought compensation for dam-
ages to their properties, even though their properties were not
presently contaminated by an underground oil spill coming from
the facility.45 The complaint was brought under claims of pri-
vate nuisance, negligence and strict liability, based upon an
alleged violation of the Virginia State Water Control Law.!
The district court found that Virginia law does not permit re-
40. Id. at 1263.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1264.
43. Id.
44. 51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995).
45. Id. at 421.
46. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18 (Cum. Supp. 1995), (prohibiting the dis-
charge of oil into or upon waters, lands, or storm drain systems within the Common-
wealth). The statute makes any person who so discharges oil liable to any person for
injury or damage to person or property, real or personal, including the loss of income,
loss of the means to produce income, or loss of the use of the damaged property for
recreational, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other reasonable uses that are
caused by such discharge. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18(C)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
The statute is a strict liability statute and entitles the prevailing plaintiff to an
award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18(F).
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covery under the facts alleged by the landowners and dismissed
each count of the Complaint and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.47
The Fourth Circuit described the fundamental issue present-
ed as "whether property owners may recover for the diminution
in value of their property and their reasonable fear of negative
health affects resulting from the proximity of their property to
an environmental hazard such as an underground oil spill."*
After a review of existing Virginia case law, the Court conclud-
ed that the landowners could not recover damages under the
theories advanced.49 The court distinguished Foley v. Harris"
by noting that in Foley the unsightly automobiles that were
deemed to constitute a private nuisance were in fact visible
from the plaintiff's property, a condition not existent in the
facts alleged by landowners in Adams.5 ' The court stated that
"[u]nder Virginia law, in order to recover for a nuisance, a
property owner must show 'the nuisance complained of will or
does produce such a condition of things as, in the judgment of
reasonable men, is naturally productive of actual physical dis-
comfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities.... .'""
The Fourth Circuit noted that "[i]n all Virginia cases permit-
ting recovery for private nuisance, the activity or condition
complained of was physically perceptible from the plaintiffs
property." 3 In Adams, the complaint indicated that the under-
ground oil spill was incapable of detection from the landowners'
properties.' The court concluded that to permit a nuisance
claim under these facts would extend Virginia nuisance law be-
yond its current boundaries, which the Fourth Circuit declined
to do absent a clear indication from Virginia courts."
47. Adams, 51 F.3d at 421. The district court decision can be found at 851 F.
Supp. 770 (E.D. Va. 1994). The District Court action was dismissed on a Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
48. Adams, 51 F.3d at 421-22.
49. Id.
50. 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186 (1982) (noting that maintenance of junked auto-
mobiles on property constituted a private nuisance).
51. Adams, 51 F.3d at 422-23.
52. Id. at 422 (quoting Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656 (1927)).
53. Id. at 422-23.
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id.
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As to the negligence count, the district court had assumed
that Star Enterprise's negligence caused the oil spill, but dis-
missed the negligence claim on the ground that the spill was
not the proximate cause of the landowners' alleged damages."a
The Fourth Circuit held that, under Virginia law, absent a
physical impact on the landowners' properties, the alleged dam-
ages are no more compensable in a cause of action for negli-
gence than in a cause of action for private nuisance.57
The property damage claim fared no better. The landowners
argued that Star Enterprise's negligence interfered with their
ability to contract with third parties for the sale of their homes
because the oil spill created a stigma which reduced the value
of their homes due to "fear in the minds of the buying pub-
lic.""8 The court characterized these damages as purely eco-
nomic or pecuniary losses which are generally non-compensable
in the absence of direct physical impact.59 The court also noted
that the landowners had not cited any cases establishing an
exception to the general rule which disallows recovery for eco-
nomic harm absent physical impact.0 Thus, the court conclud-
ed that the landowners could not recover for the alleged negli-
gence without first demonstrating an actual physical en-
croachment on or damage to their properties.6
Finally, the court held that the Virginia State Water Control
Law precluded recovery for mere economic losses caused by the
diminution in value of property that is not physically impacted
by an oil discharge." The court stated,
56. Id.
57. Id. The court of appeals cited Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214
(1973), for the proposition that, "where conduct is merely negligent, not willful, wan-
ton, or vindictive, and physical impact is lacking, there can be no recovery for emo-
tional disturbance alone." Adams, 51 F.3d at 423. In order to recover for the emotion-
al fears and apprehensions claimed, the plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the emotional stress produced a physical injury. Id. 'Thus, [the]
landowners' fears of future harm and rn-health effects from the migration of the oil
spill are not compensable under Virginia law absent of showing a physical impact or
physical injury." Id.
58. Id. at 424.
59. Id. at 425.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 424-25.
62. Id.
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If the Virginia Legislature had wished not only to extend
liability for oil spills to reasonable conduct [by adoption of a
strict liability statute], but also to expand that liability
beyond common-law boundaries and extend it to all proper-
ty owners whose property values were adversely affected by
an oil spill, it certainly would have done so in far more
express terms. We therefore conclude the district court
correctly dismissed Landowners' claim for damages under
Virginia's State Water Control Law.63
Damage recoveries for environmental contamination fared no
better under South Carolina law in Benesh v. Amphenol Corp.
(In re Wildewood Litigation).' Benesh and ten other property
owners sued Amphenol alleging nuisance, trespass and negli-
gence for the release of trichloroethane (TCE) into groundwater
and surrounding landowners' properties.65 The landowners
lived in a subdivision downhill from the plant. After the TCE
was used in the plant, it was discharged into a "percolation
basin," described as a depression dug in the ground, where the
TCE was left to evaporate.66 Amphenol expected that the TCE
that did not evaporate would be bound in the soil and would
not migrate to the groundwater.67 The TCE levels of some of
the owners' properties in a nearby lake fell within a range near
or above the EPA and the South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) drinking water
contamination levels.8 However, the plaintiffs' drinking water
was not contaminated by the TCE at issue. 9 The court found
that there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a
jury could reasonably find that Amphenol was not negligent per
se for the discharge of the TCE into the percolation basin.0
The Fourth Circuit concluded that a regulation prohibiting any
waste amenable to treatment from being discharged into the
waters of the state without such treatment was not violated
63. Id. at 426.
64. 52 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 1995).
65. Id. at 501.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 502-03.
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since the jury could reasonably find that Amphenol treated the
TCE by releasing it into the percolation basin first.7
The court also affirmed the directed verdict on the private
nuisance claim, holding that because the TCE levels did not
rise to the level of toxicological concern, the landowners pre-
sented no evidence that Amphenol had unreasonably interfered
with the use and enjoyment of their property.72 It appears that
the Fourth Circuit interprets South Carolina law to mean that
only an impact which rises to the level of a toxicological
concern constitutes an unreasonable interference with the use
and enjoyment of another's property. Apparently, once the im-
pact reaches that level a diminution in property values will be
deemed to be an unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of property, justifying a recovery for damages on a
nuisance claim. Assuming this analysis to be accurate, it ap-
pears that recovery of damages for a private nuisance under
South Carolina law for environmental contamination requires
more than the physical impact required under Virginia law as
articulated in Adams.73
Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction74 involved a
pro se § 1983 and § 1985 complaint7" by a state prisoner who
alleged forced exposure to asbestos and resulting psychological
and medical injuries. The district court dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limita-
tions.76 The Fourth Circuit, in a two-one decision, disagreed
and reversed, holding that it was not apparent from the face of
the complaint that it was not filed within the prescribed statute
of limitations.77
The analysis presented by the majority of the court related to
the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which permits a court to
71. Id. at 502 n. 2, 503.
72. Id. at 503. The owners produced testimony of an expert real estate appraiser
describing sixty to eighty percent decreases in the values of the plaintiffs' properties
as a result of the TCE plume. Id. at 502. It does not appear that the jury verdict on
the trespass claim was appealed to the court of appeals.
73. See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
74. 42 F.3d 1472 (4th Cir. 1995).
75. Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1988).
76. Nasim, 42 F.3d at 1474.
77. Id. at 1473-1474.
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dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it is satisfied that
the action is factually (its allegations are fantastic, delusional
or otherwise clearly baseless) and legally (the claims are based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory) frivolous.7" Of inter-
est to environmental lawyers, however, is the court's determina-
tion that the plaintiffs' legal theory had an arguable basis in
law and fact. The plaintiff alleged that the warden had pur-
posely or with deliberate indifference exposed the prisoner to a
toxic substance that endangered his health, a violation of his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. 9 Time will tell if civil rights litigation and envi-
ronmental law will meet as a new method to advance plaintiffs'
personal injury theories of recovery.
In an appeal of an electric transmission line condemnation
proceeding, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a landown-
er was not entitled to compensation for diminution in the mar-
ket value of the remaining land attributable to the fears of
cancer held by prospective purchasers. In Chappell v. Virginia
Electric and Power Company," the trial court granted a "mo-
tion in limine to exclude 'evidence of, or reference to, electro-
magnetic fields (EMF), any alleged link between EMF and
adverse human health effects, any alleged public perception of
any such link, and the effects, if any, of any such perception on
property values.'"'" On appeal, the landowner challenged the
quantum of the award of damage to the residue, contending
that it was error to exclude evidence of public fear emanating
from the presence of high voltage power lines and the effect of
that fear on market value. 2
The court noted that the record did not contain a proffer
showing "comparable sales consummated at prices allegedly
78. Id. at 1474-77 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988)).
79. Id. at 1473-74. The prisoner stated a cause of action under the Eighth
Amendment when he alleged that the prison officials with deliberate indifference
exposed him to a toxic substance. Id. at 1475 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct.
2475, 2481, (1993)). The court of appeals noted that while the plaintiffs allegations
that he was injured due to falling asbestos were unlikely, that was not a basis to
dismiss the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Id. at 1480.
80. 250 Va. 169, 458 S.E.2d 282, (1995).
81. Id. at 171, 458 S.E.2d at 283.
82. Id. at 172, 458 S.E.2d at 284.
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diminished by public fear of electric transmission lines."3 Not-
ing the difficulty of proving market value loss when there are
no actual sales of comparable property," and that the record
failed to show that the difference in the value of the residue
immediately before and immediately after the condemnation
was greater than the award, the court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court's confirmation of the condemnation award.85
Another environmental property damage case of note is
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co.8" Landowners
sought damages and injunctive relief in state court alleging
that defendants negligently operated a chemical plant "by re-
leasing hazardous substances into the soil, air, and groundwa-
ter in the vicinity of their property, thus creating grave threats,
both economic and physical, to the plaintiffs."87 Defendants
removed the case to federal court alleging that the complaint
raised federal questions sufficient to confer original jurisdiction
on the district court." Plaintiffs unsuccessfiilly moved for re-
mand of the case to the state courts by arguing that mere cita-
tion of federal statutes which specify less relief than that
sought by the plaintiffs does not transform a state law tort ac-
tion into a case that must be tried in federal court. 89
The Fourth Circuit held that the reference to federal environ-
mental statutes in a state common law negligence action could
not support federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
First, the remedy sought in the complaint (damages) cannot be
obtained under the federal statutes." Second, the plaintiffs are
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 174, 458 S.E.2d at 285.
86. 29 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1994).
87. Id. at 149.
88. Id. at 149-50.
89. Id. at 150. The district court noted that while the environmental statutes
cited in the complaint (Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2671 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992k
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act 42, U.S.C. §
9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) created private causes of action, these claims could
not be brought by the plaintiffs because they had failed to comply with the require-
ments of these statutes for instituting such actions. Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 150.
90. Id. at 154.
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either procedurally or substantively barred from proceeding
under any of the environmental statutes cited in the com-
plaint." Thus, the court concluded that "the Plaintiffs' inability
to proceed under these [environmental] statutes constitutes a
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation
of the statute[s] as an element of a state cause of action for
negligence per se is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal
question jurisdiction."92 Although not explicitly addressed by
the decision, it appears that, as far as the Fourth Circuit is
concerned, allegations of federal environmental law violations
are perfectly appropriate to support state common law negli-
gence claims for damages under a negligence per se theory.
A final environmental property damage case of note is an
unreported decision in Summit Realty Co. v. Sears Roebuck &
Co." The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia granted Sears' motion for partial summary judg-
ment, declaring that under the commercial lease agreement
Sears' landlord was responsible for all costs associated with
bringing the underground storage tank (UST) into compliance
with underground storage tank regulations. 4 The UST was
operated by Sears, but owned by the landlord. The Court de-
nied Sears' request to be awarded attorneys' fees and costs as
the "substantially prevailing party" under RCRA_95 Sears ar-
gued it should have been awarded its attorneys' fees even
though the court dismissed the landlord's federal and state law
environmental claim.96
Pursuant to a 1976 lease, Sears installed two underground
storage tanks, one for gasoline and one for waste oil. 7 In
1983, Sears entered into a new lease with the landlord, relo-
cating the Sears store. 8 The new lease terminated the 1976
91. Id. at 152-53.
92. Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814
(1984)).
93. Civil Action No. 4:94CV00067 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 1995).
94. Id. slip op. at 9.
95. Id. slip op. at 16. RCRA provides that a court "may award costs of litigation
to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines
such an award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988).
96. Summit Realty, slip op. at 16.
97. Id. slip op. at 2.
98. Id.
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lease and allowed Sears to continue to utilize the UST's until
such time, if any, as the landlord relocated or replaced the
existing UST's.99 Subsequently, new UST's were placed under-
ground at the new facility by parties other than Sears, and the
old tanks were removed.' As state and federal deadlines for
UST upgrades approached, the landlord and Sears disagreed as
to responsibility for the upgrade.'0 ' Unable to resolve the dis-
agreement, Sears advised the Virginia Department of Environ-
mental Quality that it had abandoned the tanks and that they
would be removed at its expense while reserving the right to
seek compensation from the landlord.0 2 The landlord chose to
file a complaint against Sears alleging violations of CERCLA,
RCRA, and the Virginia Oil Discharge Statute and asserting
common law claims for unlawful detainer and waste.' 3 Sears
filed an answer denying liability and filed a counterclaim seek-
ing contribution for any cleanup costs it had incurred and seek-
ing damages for costs incurred by Sears enclosure and cleanup
of the site under the lease.'0
The district court held that the underground storage tanks
constituted "fixtures" since they were buried completely below
the surface, covered by asphalt or concrete, and installed to
fulfill an essential purpose for which the leasehold was being
used.' 5 In addition, the intent of the parties as expressed in
the 1976 and 1983 leases caused the court to conclude that the
old tanks were fixtures and the new tanks belonged solely to
the landlord.' 6 Since the lease made the landlord responsible
for additions, alterations, replacements, and repairs to the lease
premises and all its fixtures, the court concluded that the land-
lord was responsible for assuring that the UST's complied with
the upgrade requirements of the regulations.0 7 The court
ruled, however, that all costs associated with the removal and
treatment of contaminated soils and delivery of clean fill to the
99. Id.
100. Id. slip op. at 3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. slip op. at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id. slip op. at 8.
106. Id.
107. Id. slip op. at 9.
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site will be deducted from the amount Summit owes Sears for
the closure and removal of the underground storage tanks.' 5
In refusing to grant attorneys' fees to the tenant as the sub-
stantially prevailing party under RCRA, the court noted that,
although there clearly was no release of hazardous substances
at the site as defined by the applicable statutes, the claims that
were ultimately dismissed were brought by the landlord based
on a genuine concern that hazardous substances were present
on the site."9 This concern was based in part on surface
stains and other contamination directly attributable to the
tenant's use of the site." The court ruled that, in the absence
of a finding of bad faith or malice on the part of the landlord in
filing its original suit, the plaintiff should not be burdened with
attorneys' fees in this case."' The court noted that RCRA
does not explicitly require the presence of bad faith to award
attorneys' fees. However, the court concluded that, taking the
matter as a whole, the award of attorneys' fees to the defen-
dant was not appropriate."
C. Environmental and Land Use Cases
The Supreme Court of Virginia settled several issues regard-
ing the nexus between environmental law and zoning in
Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County v. County of Bruns-
wick."' A citizens' group and nearby landowners sued the
county for granting a conditional use permit (CUP) and a waste
management disposal contract in connection with the planned
construction of a regional landfill by a private company."4
The circuit court ruled that "the Board's actions were entitled
to a strong presumption of validity, and that the facts alleged
were insufficient to show that the Board engaged in arbitrary
and capricious conduct" and dismissed all counts on demurrer."'
108. Id. slip op. at 15.
109. Id. slip op. at 16.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. slip op. at 16-17.
113. 249 Va. 320, 455 S.E.2d 712 (1995).
114. Id. at 324, 455 S.E.2d at 714.
115. Id. The litigation involved two separate lawsuits. The first suit challenged the
zoning decision of the Board of Supervisors to grant the conditional use permit. The
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The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed in part and reversed
in part. In the first count the plaintiffs alleged the applicant
did not have an enforceable contract to purchase a parcel of
land intended to become a part of the landfill and thus did not
have a legally sufficient interest in the land to apply for the
CUP under the zoning ordinance and state law."' Noting that
the Board has power to issue the CUP only if done in the man-
ner required by law, the court concluded that the Taxpayers
stated a cause of action for noncompliance with the county's
zoning ordinance and reversed the trial court."
The court also reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
citizens' allegation that the county was arbitrary and capricious
in approving the CUP.'18 The citizens alleged that the county
disregarded the environmental consequences of the landfill
despite the requirements of Virginia Code sections 15.1-489 and
-490" that zoning actions protect the environment and con-
serve natural resources.' The citizens attacked the siting of
the new landfill, without conducting geotechnical studies near
the existing, leaking county landfill, which has contaminated
groundwater.' The court noted that in sustaining the demur-
rer, "the trial court referred only to the strong presumption of
authority that is accorded to legislative action" and "effectively
held that the County's zoning action is not subject to judicial
review."' The court held that the alleged facts, if true, con-
second suit challenged the waste management and disposal contract granted by the
County which is not directly pertinent to the issues raised in this article. The su-
preme court affirmed the dismissal of the taxpayers' contract challenge and held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions upon the Concerned
Taxpayers for seeking an order of accounting and restitution against certain individu-
al members of the Board for allegedly misappropriating public funds in the contract
procurement process. Id. at 334, 455 S.E.2d at 720.
116. Id. at 325, 455 S.E.2d at 714; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491 (Repl. Vol. 1989)
(requiring applicants to be the property owner or a contract owner with the owner's
written consent). The contract contained a default provision which stated that if ei-
ther Seller or Purchaser defaults the contract becomes null and void. Taxpayers al-
leged that the purported contract is a legal nullity, lacked mutuality and was unen-
forceable as a matter of law. Concerned Taxpayers, 249 Va. at 325, 455 S.E.2d at
715.
117. Concerned Taxpayers, 249 Va. at 325, 455 S.E.2d at 715.
118. Id. at 328-29, 455 S.E.2d at 717.
119. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-489 to -490 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
120. Concerned Taxpayers, 249 Va. at 327, 455 S.E.2d at 716.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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stituted probative evidence that the Board's action was
unreasonable." Until the evidence is heard "the trial court
cannot determine whether the Board's decision is 'fairly debat-
able.", 4
The court sustained the dismissal of the other counts and
held that a governing body may overrule a Planning
Commission's determination that the landfill was inconsistent
with the county's comprehensive plan, even though the Plan-
ning Commission decision had not been appealed to the
Board.' The court ruled that Virginia Code section 15.1-
456(B) does not limit the Board's authority to overrule the
action of the Planning Commission to instances when an appeal
of the Planning Commission decision is filed. 6
Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of a count challeng-
ing the zoning decision because it authorized siting of a landfill
in violation of siting requirements, and is otherwise unsuitable
as a landfill site because it violates certain siting requirements
established by the Virginia Waste Management Act and the
Solid Waste Management Regulations. 2' The court held that
"[t]he Waste Management Act does not require a local govern-
ing body to determine whether a use is in compliance with the
Act's provisions."" That function is delegated to the Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) after determining that
the proposed facility poses no substantial danger to human
health or the environment."
Another landfill challenge involving a challenge to a permit
issued by DEQ for a private company for a regional landfill in
King and Queen County was adjudicated in Residents Involved
123. Id. at 328, 455 S.E.2d at 716.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 326, 455 S.E.2d at 716.
126. Id. at 326-27, 455 S.E.2d at 716. 'Code § 15.1-456(B) permits a governing
body to overrule the action of the local commission. That section does not limit the
governing body's authority to overrule the action of the local commission to instances
when an appeal is filed by the owners or their agents. Rather, the governing body
may overrule the commission on its own motion by a majority vote." Id. (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-456(B) (Cure. Supp. 1995)).
127. Id. at 328, 455 S.E.2d at 716-17.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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in Saving the Environment, Inc. v. Commonwealth.' The first
issue in this permit challenge, pursuant to the Virginia Admin-
istrative Process Act,'' was whether a permittee intervenor
has the right to move for a change of venue to the circuit court
wherein the proposed facility is to be located."2 The court
held that a defendant must move to change venue within twen-
ty-one days of service of process or within the time of extension
for filing responsive pleadings."' Since the original defendant,
DEQ, did not object to venue, there was no other party in the
case to object within the time required." Any objection to
venue not made within the required time is waived and an
intervenor "is not in a position to assert an objection to
venue.""35
The second issue, decided in a separate opinion,"6 involved
the extent to which the Director of DEQ must investigate
whether the proposed facility poses a substantial present or
potential danger to human health or the environment pursuant
to Virginia Code section 10.1-1408.1."' The plaintiffs urged
that the statute requires DEQ to conduct an independent inves-
tigation and make a determination of no adverse human health
or environmental impact before issuing the permit. 3' The
Court held that the "investigation and evaluation" requirement
does not require the Director to conduct an independent investi-
gation."' The statute requires the Director "to investigate and
evaluate the comments of the local government to see that the
130. 32 Va. Cir. 336 (Richmond City 1994).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:1 to :25 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
132. Residents, 32 Va. Cir. at 337.
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 337.
135. Id.
136. Residents Involved in Saving the Environment, Inc., v. Commonwealth, No.
HAD-822-1 (Richmond City 1995) (letter opinion from Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge,
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, to counsel (May 4, 1995) (on fie with the
University of Richmond Law Review)).
137. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993). This Code Section
provides, in part, that "[n]o permit for a new solid waste management facility shall
be issued until the Director has determined, after investigation and evaluation of
comments by the local government, that the proposed facility poses no substantial
present or potential danger to human health or the environment...." Id. § 10.1-
1408.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
138. Residents Involved in Saving the Environment, Inc., slip op. at 2.
139. Id.
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proposed facility has or has not any impact on human health or
the environment."' 4
The nexus between zoning amendments and preemption by
federal environmental law was the issue in Welch v. Board of
Supervisors of Rappahannock County." Several landowners
challenged a zoning ordinance amendment prohibiting applica-
tion of sewage sludge on agricultural lands in the county,
claiming that the zoning amendment was preempted by the
Federal Clean Water Act. The court examined the statute
and found it did not expressly forbid the zoning amend-
ment.' In fact, the statute clearly grants localities "the au-
thority to make determinations concerning 'the manner of dis-
posal or use of sludge ... ,' and the 'right' to pass substantive
standards regarding pollution so long as the standards are not
less stringent than federal law."'"
The plaintiffs claimed that although Congress gave localities
some role in the regulation of sludge disposal, that grant was
not sufficiently extensive to allow a locality to ban any one
practice of disposal or use through a zoning amendment."
The court determined that since the Clean Water Act and the
zoning ordinance could be harmonized, the zoning amendment
was not preempted.' The Board of Supervisors had made a
choice allowed by federal law to prohibit one form of sludge
disposal or use, but did not impermissibly prohibit all
forms.'47
D. Miscellaneous Environmental Decisions
The remaining cases described are decisions which do not fall
neatly into one of the categories specified above, but neverthe-
140. Id. The authors understand that this ruling will be appealed to the court of
appeals and may in fact be pending as of the time of publication of this article.
141. 860 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Va. 1994).
142. Id. at 330-31; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1980 & Supp. V. 1993).
143. Welch, 860 F. Supp. at 330-31.
144. Id. at 331 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §§ 1345(e), 1370 (1988)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (noting that "[w]here the state or local regulation addresses public health
concerns, there is a presumption against preemption.") (citing Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707 (1985)).
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less are, in the opinion of the authors, decisions of interest to
environmental law practitioners.
Virginia's Tenth Amendment challenges to the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 failed for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion in Virginia v. United States.' The Commonwealth
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the EPA con-
tending that (i) the Title V operating permit program, (ii) the
vehicle inspection and maintenance and the 15% volatile organ-
ic compounds (VOC) reduction program amendments to the
State Implementation Plan (SIP), (iii) the mandatory and dis-
cretionary sanction provision, and (iv) the transportation confor-
mity requirements of the Clean Air Act violate the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' The Com-
monwealth contended that Congress has coerced Virginia to
enact and enforce these regulatory programs in derogation of
state sovereignty, that these provisions constitute federal at-
tempts to control the exercise of sovereign state powers in vio-
lation of the Guarantee Clause, 50 and that the withholding of
highway funding for noncompliance with the Clean Air Act
violates the Spending Clause. 5'
The court agreed with the positions of the United States and
held that exclusive jurisdiction to review any and all EPA final
actions taken under the Clean Air Act is in the United States
Court of Appeals,5 2 and that Virginia's attack on EPA's dis-
148. No. 3:95CV21 (E.D. Va. June 12, 1995).
149. Id. slip op. at 4. The Tenth Amendment reads: 'The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. _
150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, which declares: "The United States shall guarantee
to every state in this Union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive
(when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, which reads: 'Te Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States...."
152. Virginia, slip op. at 7.
[p]etition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promul-
gating any implementation plan... or any other final action of the
Administrator under [the CAA] (including any denial or disapproval by
the Administrator under subchapter 1 of this chapter) which is locally or
regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit.
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cretionary enforcement and sanction authority, as it might
relate to the Richmond and Northern Virginia nonattainment
zones, was not ripe.'53 In dismissing the case without preju-
dice, the court expressed no opinion about the merits of
Virginia's position. "Today's decision is but a simple judgment
that there is no role for this Court to play as Virginia and the
EPA wage their ongoing dispute. The controversy must be re-
solved elsewhere.""
The nearly thirteen-year-old battle over the Lake Gaston-
Virginia Beach water supply pipeline project 55 between the
City of Virginia Beach and the State of North Carolina and oth-
ers resulted in two court decisions in 1994. In City of Virginia
Beach v. Brown,5 ' Judge Smith dismissed as moot Virginia
Beach's challenge to North Carolina's authority to review the
project for compliance with North Carolina's coastal manage-
ment plan since the United States Department of Commerce
had overruled North Carolina's objection to the project in a
completed administrative proceeding. In this litigation, Virgin-
ia Beach and Virginia Power asked the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) to amend the Virginia Power permit
to allow for the diversion."' North Carolina applied to an
agency within the United States Department of Commerce for
permission to review the pipeline project for consistency with
the North Carolina Coastal Management Plan under the Coast-
al Zone Management Act (CZMA)."5 ' The Department, through
its agency for Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, de-
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
153. Virginia, slip op. at 16. As to the Hampton Roads nonattainment zone, the
court described Virginia's position as "nothing short of ludicrous." Id. at 18. EPA has
initiated a rulemaking which is not complete and in which Virginia has ample oppor-
tunity to participate in the view of the court. Id. slip op. at 18-19.
154. Id. slip op. at 19.
155. A number of published opinions have resulted from this controversy. See
North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1991); City of Vir-
ginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, 776 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1985); North Caro-
lina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. N.C. 1990), affd sub nom. Roanoke River
Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991), and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1164
(1992); North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. N.C. 1987); Virginia Beach
v. Mecklenberg County, 246 Va. 233, 435 S.E.2d 382 (1993); Tidewater Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Virginia Beach, 241 Va. 114, 400 S.E.2d 523 (1991).
156. 858 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1994).
157. Id. at 587.
158. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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clared that North Carolina did not need permission and could
review the project under the CZMA for consistency with the
North Carolina Plan.'59 North Carolina objected to the project
as being inconsistent, and Virginia Beach appealed to the De-
partment of Commerce. 6 ° The suit was filed challenging
North Carolina's right to review a project which wholly falls in
Virginia for consistency with the North Carolina Plan. 6 ' Dur-
ing the pendency of the suit the Department overruled North
Carolina's objections on the merits.'62
Even though it had prevailed on the merits, Virginia Beach
opposed the dismissal on the grounds that it was entitled to a
declaration that the CZMA and the project's compliance with
the North Carolina Plan was inappropriate. The Court, noting
the absence of a showing that Virginia Beach is likely to be
haled before the Department of Commerce for another CZMA
review of this project, declared that this case was moot and did
not fall within the exception of being "capable of repetition, yet
evading review.""
The second Lake Gaston Pipeline case was a petition for a
writ of mandamus to compel the FERC to enter a final decision
on the application of Virginia Beach and Virginia Power for
approval of the water pipeline project. In re City of Virginia
Beach' resulted in a denial of the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus, largely due to the assufances given to the court of
appeals that the environmental impact statement required un-
der the agency's review would be expedited.'65
The court noted that mandamus can be appropriate in rare
circumstances where the ongoing agency proceedings suffer
from a "fundamental infirmity" threatening petitioner's right to
a fair proceeding." This infirmity may occur when an agency
159. Brown, 858 F. Supp. at 587. The CZMA permits states to implement coastal
management plans. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
160. Brown, 858 F. Supp. at 587.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 589-90 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911)).
164. 42 F.3d 881 (4th Cir. 1994)
165. Id. at 886.
166. Id. at 884-85.
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unduly delays the resolution of a matter in an egregious man-
ner.1 7 The court took umbrage at the fact that the agency's
environmental impact statement was not scheduled to be issued
for four and one-half years after application was made.6 ' Nev-
ertheless, the court noted that while it was not "happy" about
the overall time elapsed, it was convinced that there were ra-
tional explanations for the length of time for each segment of
the environmental review, and the petition was denied.'69
In a case somewhat similar to Virginia Board of Medicine v.
Virginia Physical Therapy Association,7 ° the Fourth Circuit
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review an EPA inter-
nal memorandum advising that a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit was required for storm
water discharges from oil and gas facility construction activities
in Appalachian Energy Group v. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy.' 7' An ad hoc affiliation of nine trade associations in the oil
and gas industry feared that the EPA was attempting, under
the guise of an internal legal interpretation, to impose an unau-
thorized regulation on oil and gas operations by requiring a
permit for every exploratory activity, most of which involve
some construction.'72 The group sought a declaration that the
memorandum was contrary to the Clean Water Act and
amounted to a new rule, adopted without compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act.'73
The court concluded that the memorandum did not approve
the issuance or denial of a permit, did not relate to a pending
decision to issue or deny a permit, and had not been used as a
basis to issue or deny a permit.'74 Moreover, the court noted,
the memorandum did not purport to issue a new rule; it only
provided the writer's interpretation of two regulations."'
Thus, the agency action sought to be reviewed was the genera-
167. Id. at 885.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 886.
170. 13 Va. App. 458, 413 S.E.2d 59 (1991), affd, 245 Va. 125, 427 S.E.2d 183
(1993).
171. 33 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994).
172. Id. at 320.
173. Id.; 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (1994).
174. Appalachian Energy, 33 F.3d at 321.
175. Id. at 322.
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tion of an internal memorandum expressing an opinion and the
transmission of that memorandum to the public. 76 The court
noted that while the memorandum might signal the position
that the EPA might eventually take with regard to NPDES
permits for such activities, until it does, it has not issued a
permit, nor has the EPA taken a final action subject to judicial
review. 7 Consequently, the court of appeals lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to review the
memorandum. 78
A final decision of note involved statutory interpretation
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 79
in Owen Electric Steel Co. v. Browner.5 ° The issue in the case
was whether the "slag" produced as a byproduct of steel produc-
tion is "discarded" and therefore a "solid waste" subject to regu-
lation or whether it is not a "discarded material" and thus
exempt from regulation because it is ultimately recycled and
used in roadbeds. 8'
After reviewing several decisions the court ruled that the
"fundamental inquiry in determining whether a byproduct has
been 'discarded' is whether the byproduct is immediately recy-
cled for use in the same industry."'82 If not, then the byprod-
uct is justifiably seen as part of the waste disposal problem and
subject to regulation as a solid waste.' Consequently, the pe-
tition was denied and the slag was required to be handled in
accord with the full panoply of RCRA regulatory require-
ments.'
176. Id. at 321-22.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see 33 U.SC. § 1369(b) (1988).
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
180. 37 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1994).
181. Id. at 148. The record revealed that the slag lies dormant, exposed on the
ground for six months before it is recycled and used for a purpose unrelated to the
manufacture of steel, i.e. as roadbed material. Id.
182. Id. at 150.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Reducing environmental regulation, streamlining government,
and providing incentives for voluntary, proactive measures have
been consistent political themes for the past few years on both
the federal and state levels. The past twelve months saw these
theories put into practice as the General Assembly and admin-
istrative agencies took steps to put the emphasis for environ-
mental protection on the private sector.
A. Environmental Audit Privileges
One of the rapidly emerging issues in environmental law is
whether voluntary environmental audits should be admissible
or discoverable against the audited party. Environmental audits
are management tools used to assess a company's compliance
with federal, state, and local environmental laws, regulations,
and ordinances, as well as internal company policies.
Some federal courts have protected such audits under the
auspices of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doc-
trine,"' or the newly recognized "self-critical analysis" privi-
lege.' The United States Environmental Protection Agency
185. In Olen Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl, Inc., 24 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,936 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1994), the Magistrate Judge ruled that environmental audit
memoranda prepared by an expert to assist the defendant's attorneys in evaluating
compliance with environmental laws were "prepared for the purpose of securing an
opinion of law" and therefore protected under the attorney-client privilege. Id. The
Magistrate Judge also ruled that the expert's notes, prepared for counsel to assist in
the defense of the pending action, were entitled to the work product doctrine's limited
immunity from discovery. Id. at 20,937.
186. In Reichhold Chem. v. Textron, Inc., 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,307 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 1994), the court held that the self-critical analysis privi-
lege afforded the landowner defendant a qualified privilege for post hoc analyses of
"past conduct, practices, and occurrences, and the resulting environmental conse-
quences." Id. at 20,309. The court limited the privilege to reports prepared for "can-
did self-evaluation" and analysis of the cause and effect of pollution, where the re-
ports were created with the expectation of confidentiality and have in fact been kept
confidential. Id. The Court noted:
[I]t is self-evident that pollution poses a serious public health risk, and
that there is a strong public interest in promoting the voluntary identifi-
cation and remediation of industrial pollution. The public interest in
allowing individuals and corporations to candidly assess their compliance
with environmental regulations "promotes sufficiently important interests
to outweigh" the interest of opposing private litigants in discovering this
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and the Department of Justice have likewise maintained poli-
cies favoring environmental self-audits for several years.'87
However, neither the federal agencies nor the federal courts can
decide the fate of such audits in state courts, and the regulated
community has found the protection offered by the federal
courts and agencies too tenuous. In response, new measures
have been proposed or enacted on both the federal and state
levels to protect and to encourage voluntary environmental
audits. Colorado and Oregon were the first states to enact such
statutes." Two bills introduced in the 104th Congress would
enact a federal privilege and borrow heavily from the two major
state law schemes. 9 The EPA recently announced and re-
quested comment on an interim policy which does not differ
markedly from its earlier policies. 9 °
potentially highly prejudicial, but minimally relevant, evidence. I view the
self-critical analysis privilege as analogous to the rule on subsequent
remedial measures [FED. EVID. 4071, and have no difficulty concluding in
the abstract that an entity's retrospective self-assessment of its compli-
ance with environmental regulations should be privileged in appropriate
cases.
Id. at 20,308. The Court further held that parties seeking to assert the privilege
must demonstrate: (1) that the information must result from a critical self-analysis
undertaken by the party seeking protection; (2) the public must have a strong inter-
est in preserving the free flow of the type of information sought; (3) the information
must be of a type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery was allowed; and (4)
the privileged document must have been prepared with the expectation that it would
be kept confidential and has, in fact, been kept confidential. Id. Application of the
Reichhold Chemicals factors to the statutory environmental privilege enacted in Vir-
ginia could result in the protection of audit documents from disclosure in federal
court actions brought under federal environmental statutes.
187. See Department of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for
Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclo-
sure Efforts by the Violator, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,399 (July 1, 1991);
Voluntary Environment Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60
Fed. Reg. 16875 (Apr. 3, 1995); Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,004 (July 9, 1986).
188. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1994); OR. REV.
STAT. § 468.963 (Supp. 1994).
189. See H.R. 1047, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Voluntary Environmental Self-
Evaluation Act) and S. 582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Voluntary Environmental
Audit Protection Act). H.R. 1047, introduced by Congressman Hefley (R-CO), is mod-
eled after the Colorado statute. S. 582, introduced by Senator Hatfield (R-OR), reflects
minor compromises between the Colorado and Oregon statutes.
190. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (Apr. 3, 1995).
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The 1995 Session of the General Assembly also responded to
the issue in a more concrete fashion by enacting an audit privi-
lege statute.191 The new statute protects voluntary environ-
mental audits in two ways: it protects information collected,
generated, or developed in thp course of an environmental au-
dit, and it shields those who voluntarily disclose and diligently
correct violations of environmental laws. 2 This new statute is
akin to pre-existing Virginia and federal legislation providing a
self-critical analysis privilege in the context of health care peer
reviews. 93
Under the new Virginia statute, information collected, gener-
ated, or developed during the course of an environmental au-
dit"94 is privileged from public disclosure under most circum-
stances. The audit may be conducted by the owner or operator
of a facility or by an independent contractor at the request of
the owner or operator.' No person who possesses or helps to
prepare an audit document may be compelled to disclose the
document, information about its contents, or the details of its
preparation.' Furthermore, absent written consent of the
owner or operator, the information is not admissible in an
administrative or judicial proceeding."7 The statute specifi-
cally protects "information collected, generated or developed in
the course of, or resulting from, an environmental assessment,
including but not limited to field notes, records of observation,
findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda,
drawings, photographs, videotape, computer-generated or elec-
191. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to -1199 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
192. Id.
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
581.16 to -581.17 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1995).
194. "'Environmental assessment' means a voluntary evaluation of activities or
facilities or of management systems related to such activities or facilities that is
designed to identify noncompliance with environmental laws and regulations, promote
compliance with environmental laws and regulations, or identify opportunities for
improved efficiency or pollution prevention." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(A) (Cum.
Supp. 1995).
195. Id. Similarly there is no requirement that the information must be produced
as a result of an information request by the Department of Environmental Quality or
other agency of the Commonwealth or political subdivision. Id.
196. Id. § 10.1-1198(A).
197. Id. § 10.1-1198(B).
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tronically recorded information, maps, charts, graphs and sur-
veys."
198
Despite the breadth of the audit privilege, disclosure of audit
documents or information may be compelled in four circum-
stances: (1) when information is uncovered that demonstrates a
clear, imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
the environment; (2) when information contained in the audit is
already required by law to be disclosed, i.e., as a condition of
an environmental permit or pre-existing consent order; (3) when
information contained in the audit was prepared independently
of the voluntary environmental audit; and (4) when audit docu-
ments or portions thereof are collected, generated or developed
in bad faith.'" One asserting the privilege has the burden of
proving a prima facie case that the privilege applies."' The
elements of a prima facie case are that the audit (1) was con-
ducted by or at the behest of the facility owner or operator; (2)
was voluiitary; and (3) was designed to identify areas of en-
vironmental noncompliance with law or identify opportunities
for improved efficiency or pollution prevention. 0 ' Once this
burden has been carried, the burden shifts to the party seeking
disclosure of the information to prove, based upon independent
knowledge, that a statutory exception to the privilege exists. 2
If the party seeking disclosure demonstrates probable cause
to believe that an exception applies, a hearing officer or court
may have access to the relevant portion of the document to
conduct an in camera review for the sole purpose of determin-
ing whether an exception applies.0" The court or hearing ex-
aminer may have access to the relevant portion of a document
under such conditions as may be necessary to protect its confi-
dentiality.2"' A moving party who obtains access to the docu-
ment or information may not divulge any information from the
198. Id. § 10.1-1198(A).
199. Id. § 10.1-1198(B).
200. Id. § 10.1-1198(C).
201. Id.
202. Id. The person attempting to compel disclosure must be a party to an infor-
mal fact-finding proceeding held pursuant to § 9-6.14:11 at which a hearing officer is
present, a formal hearing pursuant to § 9-6.14:12, or a judicial proceeding. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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document or other information except as specifically allowed by
the hearing examiner or the court.
215
A second feature of the legislation is a statutory immunity
from administrative or civil penalties 25  for voluntarily dis-
closed violations. 27 The statute states that, "to the extent con-
sistent with requirements imposed by federal law, any person
making a voluntary disclosure of information to a state or local
regulatory agency regarding a violation of an environmental
statute, regulation, permit or administrative order is immune
from administrative or civil penalties authorized thereun-
der."202 A disclosure is 'voluntary' if
(i) it is not otherwise required by law, regulation, permit or
administrative order, (ii) it is made promptly after knowl-
edge of the violation is obtained through a voluntary envi-
ronmental assessment, and (iii) the person making the
disclosure corrects the violation in a diligent manner in
accordance with a compliance schedule submitted to the
appropriate state or local regulatory agencies.... 209
Persons who make voluntary disclosures in bad faith may not
invoke the immunity.210
Whether the statute will apply in federal courts is an open
question. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the state law
privilege may not apply to federal enforcement actions or to
citizen suits or private cost recovery actions brought under
federal law.2 '
205. Id.
206. Id. The statute does not bar a civil action against an owner or operator
claiming compensation for injury to persons or property. Id.
207. Id. § 10.1-1199.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that privileges in federal courts are
governed by the Constitution, federal statutes, Rules of the Supreme Court, and com-
mon law principles as interpreted by federal courts, except in civil actions where
state law provides the rule of decision. FED. R. EVID. 501.
For its part, the new Virginia statute provides that it does not "alter, limit,
waive or abrogate any other statutory or common law privilege." VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1198(B) (Cum. Supp. 1995). To the extent that the Virginia audit privilege stat-
ute is viewed as conferring a substantive versus a procedural right, federal courts
may honor the privilege and prohibit disclosure of audit documents.
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B. Voluntary Remediation
It is universally recognized that the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 19802"
(CERCLA or Superfund) needs reform. Last year's Survey re-
ported that Superfund reauthorization .was overdue in the
103rd Congress." Despite sweeping political change in both
chambers, the 104th Congress has also failed, as of the date
this article was written, to enact consensus amendments, prof-
fered a year before, to mitigate CERCLA's harsh liability
scheme, accelerate cleanups, and implement site-specific, risk-
based cleanup goals based upon surrounding uses, the proposed
future use of the site, and the characteristics of the waste.
The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
implemented an informal Voluntary Remediation Program
(VRP) administratively in 1993, under the auspices of the
Waste Management Board's general authority, to encourage and
expedite voluntary cleanups of hazardous waste sites. The regu-
lated community's initial interest in the program faded due to
bureaucratic hurdles, inadequate staffing, and inflexible, lowest
common denominator cleanup standards. In its two-year history,
few entities, if any, signed on to the program.
In response, the 1995 General Assembly enacted a statutory
VRP with the same mission: reduce, if not eliminate, the need
for DEQ enforcement actions or cleanups. 14 Under the stat-
ute, the Waste Management Board must promulgate regulations
implementing the program by July 1, 1997.5 During the in-
terim, the DEQ is directed to administer a voluntary
remediation program on a case-by-case basis consistent with the
criteria set forth in the statute. 6
Under the statute, persons who own, operate, have a security
interest in or enter into a contract for the purchase of contami-
nated property are eligible to participate in the program.1 7
212. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
213. Buniva & Kibler, supra note 1, at 1074.
214. VA. CODE ANN. §§10.1-1429.1 to -1429.3 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
215. Id. § 10.1-1429.1(B).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 10.1-1429.3.
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Sites are eligible so long as remediation has not clearly been
mandated by the EPA, the DEQ, or a court order pursuant to
CERCLA, RCRA,218 the Virginia Waste Management Act,
219
the State Water Control Law220 or other applicable statutory
or common law.2 ' Cleanups of releases of hazardous substanc-
es, hazardous wastes, solid wastes or petroleum are eligible
under the VRP.222
One key feature of the new VRP is the requirement that
DEQ establish methodologies to determine site-specific, risk-
based remediation standards.2  In the past, regulators have
employed "cookie-cutter" approaches to determining cleanup lev-
els, sometimes requiring contaminated sites to be "cleaner" than
surrounding parcels which were not deemed to be contaminated
enough to warrant attention. The DEQ must consider protection
of public health and the environment and future industrial,
commercial, residential, or other uses of the property to be
remediated and the surrounding properties.21 The Depart-
ment will evaluate reasonably available and effective
remediation technology and analytical quantitation technology,
the availability of relatively less expensive institutional or engi-
neering controls, and natural background levels for hazardous
constituents when considering cleanup goals.2' By law, the
remediation standards can be no more stringent than applicable
or appropriate relevant federal standards (ARARs).226 The
218. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
219. VA_ CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1401 to -1457 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Curn. Supp. 1995).
220. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:28 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cure. Supp.
1995).
221. VA_ CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429(A) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
222. Id.
223. Id. § 10.1-1429.1(A)(1).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. "Applicable requirements" and "relevant and appropriate requirements" are
terms of art and defined in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. 300 (1994). Known collectively by the acronym
ARARs, these are standards under federal or state law which specifically address a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or circumstance at a CERCLA site or which are suffi-
ciently similar to supply a standard for the cleanup. Id. § 300.5. The NCP requires
identification of ARARs for cleanups under CERCLA. Id. §§ 300.400(g), 300.700(c).
State law standards must be more stringent than federal requirements in order
to be "applicable" or "relevant and appropriate" under the NCP and CERCLA. Id. §
300.5.
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DEQ is also to establish procedures that minimize the delay
and expense of remediation, both on the part of the party un-
dertaking the remediation and by the Department in processing
submissions and overseeing remediation. The streamlined pro-
cess will include waivers or expedited issuance of any required
permits.
227
The key benefit of participating in the VRP is the issuance of
"no further action" letters at the program's conclusion.
When a voluntary cleanup achieves applicable cleanup stan-
dards or DEQ determines that no further action is required,
DEQ will issue certifications of satisfactory completion of
remediation, based on then-present conditions and available
information.2 1 Certification also provides immunity from en-
forcement actions under the Waste Management Act,230 the
State Water Control Law,"' the Virginia Air Pollution Control
Law,21 2 or other applicable state law.' Such a certification
signals potential purchasers, lenders and others that the site is
"clean" and that the risk of future liability is minimized.
Lack of adequate staffing was one impediment to the success
of the informal VRP. The new statute seeks to correct this by
establishing registration fees to fund the program. 2' The fees
are to be used to defray DEQ's actual, reasonable costs expend-
ed at the site and may not exceed $5,000 or one percent of the
cost of the remediation, whichever is less.
23 5
The statute also recognizes that contamination does not re-
spect property boundaries, and that the cooperation of adjacent
landowners is often necessary to effect a cleanup. The statute
authorizes DEQ, at the request of the person volunteering to
remediate the site, to seek temporary access to private or public
property where necessary to conduct the remediation.236 A
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.1(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
228. Id. § 10.1-1429.1(A)(3).
229. Id.
230. Id. §§ 10.1-1400 to -1457.
231. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:28 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp.
1995).
232. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1300 to -1326 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1995).
233. Id. § 10.1-1429.2.
234. Id. § 10.1-1429.1(A)(5).
235. Id.
236. Id. § 10.1-1429.3.
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property owner who denies DEQ access creates a rebuttable
presumption that the owner waives his rights, claims, and caus-
es of action against the person volunteering to pdrform the
remediation.37 The presumption may be rebutted by showing
good cause for the denial or by showing that the person re-
questing access acted in bad faith.
2 31
Regulations implementing the VRP are not likely until July
1, 1997. In the interim, DEQ is expected to encourage proactive
behavior by owners and operators, to minimize staff micro-man-
agement, and to focus on establishing a site-specific remediation
plan based upon a fair assessment of the risks that the contam-
ination poses to nearby residents or the environment. In addi-
tion, DEQ officials are investigating ways to eliminate red tape
and minimize delays in cleanup implementation.
C. Revised Medical Waste Incinerator Regulations
On July 14, 1994, the State Air Pollution Control Board
adopted final regulations pertaining to medical waste incinera-
tors." '9 These final regulations were markedly different and
decidedly less stringent than the proposed regulations. Among
other things, the final regulations eased restrictions on emis-
sions of particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride,
dioxins, and furans. Accounts in the popular press attributed
the change to new members of the Board.2"
Opponents of the new regulations invoked a provision in the
Virginia Administrative Process Act which stays the regulatory
process if more than twenty-five persons petition the agency for
an opportunity to submit oral and written comments on a final
regulation that is substantially different than the one pro-
posed.24' More than 1,100 persons petitioned the Air Board to
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. VR 120-01. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution (Re-
vision HH-Rule 5-6, Regulated Medical Waste Incinerators), §§ 120-05-0601 to -0618,
10:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 5706 (1994).
240. See, e.g., Rex Springston, Lax New Air Pollution Rules to Get a New Airing:
They Will Regulate Medical Waste Incinerators, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 4,
1994, at B-5.
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6:14:7.1(K) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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reconsider.242 The Board held an additional public hearing on
the final regulations, permitted additional written public com-
ments, and readopted the final regulations without change.'
D. Tax Incentives for Pollution Control
Tax incentives are often suggested as an alternative to regLi-
lation, a derivative of market-based incentives. The General
Assembly acted in 1995 to amend the statutes pertaining to the
classes of pollution control equipment eligible for exemption
from the state sales and use tax and local personal property
taxes. The legislature designated the Department of Mines,
Minerals, and Energy, rather than the Department of Environ-
mental Quality, as the certifying authority for certified pollution
control equipment and facilities used in coal, oil, and gas pro-
duction.' Legislation also broadened the types of facilities
and equipment eligible for the exemption to include waste dis-
posal facilities certified by the Waste Management Board."
E. Coal Combustion By-Products
Participants in the Governor's "Opportunity Virginia" project,
designed to develop a statewide strategic plan for economic
development, identified regulatory requirements for fly-ash
disposal as an impediment to continued competitiveness of the
state's coal industry and of Southwest Virginia.' In response,
the Waste Management Board adopted regulations exempting
coal combustion by-products from the Virginia Solid Waste
Management Regulations and permitting use of such materials
in structural fills and mined land reclamation projects. ' The
242. See Springston, supra note 240.
243. VR 120-01, Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution (Re-
vision -H - Rule 5-6, Regulated Medical Waste Incinerators), §§ 120-05-0601 to -0618,
11:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 2405 (1995).
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.3(9) (Cum. Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
246. GEORGE ALLEN & ROBERT T. SKUNDA, OPPORTUNITY VIRGINIA: A STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR JOBS AND PROSPERITY 73 (1994).
247. VR 672-20-20, Regulation Governing Management of Coal Combustion By-
Products, §§ 1.1 to 5.2, 11:9 Va. Regs. Reg. 1470 (1995).
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regulations contain certain siting requirements, but allow for
disposal of coal combustion by-products without a permit if the
operator can demonstrate legal control of the site throughout
closure and certify that levels of certain constituents will not
exceed maximum levels set out in the regulations.'
F. Title V Operating Permit Program
The Air Pollution Control Board continued its efforts to im-
plement an operating permit program. Under Title V of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, each state must submit to
the EPA a program requiring operating permits for most signifi-
cant sources of regulated emissions.249 Although the Air Board
adopted and published final regulations on the topic, to date
the EPA and the Commonwealth have failed to agree that
Virginia's program meets the EPA's standards. Among the is-
sues to be resolved are whether Virginia's laws sufficiently
provide citizens with standing to challenge permitting decisions,
the types of sources required to comply with the permitting
program, and whether Virginia's program adequately provides
for permits to specify applicable federal requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the cases, statutes, and regulations of the past year dem-
onstrate, the laws and regulations of Virginia are becoming
increasingly important in environmental law. Virginia's political
leaders have attempted to assert primacy over environmental
control in the Commonwealth. Prospects for continued litigation
over Clean Air Act issues and the impact of Virginia's new
audit privilege statute on enforcement promise that the interac-
tion of federal and state regulatory efforts will continue for
some time to come.
248. Id.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (Supp. V 1993).
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